diff --git a/grub/grub-efi/debian/patches/0035-video-readers-png-Drop-greyscale-support-to-fix-heap.patch b/grub/grub-efi/debian/patches/0035-video-readers-png-Drop-greyscale-support-to-fix-heap.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..efacbb2c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/grub/grub-efi/debian/patches/0035-video-readers-png-Drop-greyscale-support-to-fix-heap.patch @@ -0,0 +1,171 @@ +From 157486f818ecbe26b7962f5795a8f48393ba5169 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Axtens +Date: Tue, 6 Jul 2021 18:51:35 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH 1/6] video/readers/png: Drop greyscale support to fix heap + out-of-bounds write + +A 16-bit greyscale PNG without alpha is processed in the following loop: + + for (i = 0; i < (data->image_width * data->image_height); + i++, d1 += 4, d2 += 2) + { + d1[R3] = d2[1]; + d1[G3] = d2[1]; + d1[B3] = d2[1]; + } + +The increment of d1 is wrong. d1 is incremented by 4 bytes per iteration, +but there are only 3 bytes allocated for storage. This means that image +data will overwrite somewhat-attacker-controlled parts of memory - 3 bytes +out of every 4 following the end of the image. + +This has existed since greyscale support was added in 2013 in commit +3ccf16dff98f (grub-core/video/readers/png.c: Support grayscale). + +Saving starfield.png as a 16-bit greyscale image without alpha in the gimp +and attempting to load it causes grub-emu to crash - I don't think this code +has ever worked. + +Delete all PNG greyscale support. + +Fixes: CVE-2021-3695 + +Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/video/readers/png.c | 87 +++-------------------------------- + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 80 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/video/readers/png.c b/grub-core/video/readers/png.c +index 4827b9c..1e35eae 100644 +--- a/grub-core/video/readers/png.c ++++ b/grub-core/video/readers/png.c +@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ struct grub_png_data + + unsigned image_width, image_height; + int bpp, is_16bit; +- int raw_bytes, is_gray, is_alpha, is_palette; ++ int raw_bytes, is_alpha, is_palette; + int row_bytes, color_bits; + grub_uint8_t *image_data; + +@@ -284,13 +284,13 @@ grub_png_decode_image_header (struct grub_png_data *data) + data->bpp = 3; + else + { +- data->is_gray = 1; +- data->bpp = 1; ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, ++ "png: color type not supported"); + } + + if ((color_bits != 8) && (color_bits != 16) + && (color_bits != 4 +- || !(data->is_gray || data->is_palette))) ++ || !data->is_palette)) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, + "png: bit depth must be 8 or 16"); + +@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ grub_png_decode_image_header (struct grub_png_data *data) + } + + #ifndef GRUB_CPU_WORDS_BIGENDIAN +- if (data->is_16bit || data->is_gray || data->is_palette) ++ if (data->is_16bit || data->is_palette) + #endif + { + data->image_data = grub_calloc (data->image_height, data->row_bytes); +@@ -863,27 +863,8 @@ grub_png_convert_image (struct grub_png_data *data) + int shift; + int mask = (1 << data->color_bits) - 1; + unsigned j; +- if (data->is_gray) +- { +- /* Generic formula is +- (0xff * i) / ((1U << data->color_bits) - 1) +- but for allowed bit depth of 1, 2 and for it's +- equivalent to +- (0xff / ((1U << data->color_bits) - 1)) * i +- Precompute the multipliers to avoid division. +- */ +- +- const grub_uint8_t multipliers[5] = { 0xff, 0xff, 0x55, 0x24, 0x11 }; +- for (i = 0; i < (1U << data->color_bits); i++) +- { +- grub_uint8_t col = multipliers[data->color_bits] * i; +- palette[i][0] = col; +- palette[i][1] = col; +- palette[i][2] = col; +- } +- } +- else +- grub_memcpy (palette, data->palette, 3 << data->color_bits); ++ ++ grub_memcpy (palette, data->palette, 3 << data->color_bits); + d1c = d1; + d2c = d2; + for (j = 0; j < data->image_height; j++, d1c += data->image_width * 3, +@@ -920,60 +901,6 @@ grub_png_convert_image (struct grub_png_data *data) + } + return; + } +- +- if (data->is_gray) +- { +- switch (data->bpp) +- { +- case 4: +- /* 16-bit gray with alpha. */ +- for (i = 0; i < (data->image_width * data->image_height); +- i++, d1 += 4, d2 += 4) +- { +- d1[R4] = d2[3]; +- d1[G4] = d2[3]; +- d1[B4] = d2[3]; +- d1[A4] = d2[1]; +- } +- break; +- case 2: +- if (data->is_16bit) +- /* 16-bit gray without alpha. */ +- { +- for (i = 0; i < (data->image_width * data->image_height); +- i++, d1 += 4, d2 += 2) +- { +- d1[R3] = d2[1]; +- d1[G3] = d2[1]; +- d1[B3] = d2[1]; +- } +- } +- else +- /* 8-bit gray with alpha. */ +- { +- for (i = 0; i < (data->image_width * data->image_height); +- i++, d1 += 4, d2 += 2) +- { +- d1[R4] = d2[1]; +- d1[G4] = d2[1]; +- d1[B4] = d2[1]; +- d1[A4] = d2[0]; +- } +- } +- break; +- /* 8-bit gray without alpha. */ +- case 1: +- for (i = 0; i < (data->image_width * data->image_height); +- i++, d1 += 3, d2++) +- { +- d1[R3] = d2[0]; +- d1[G3] = d2[0]; +- d1[B3] = d2[0]; +- } +- break; +- } +- return; +- } + + { + /* Only copy the upper 8 bit. */ +-- +2.17.1 + diff --git a/grub/grub-efi/debian/patches/0036-video-readers-png-Avoid-heap-OOB-R-W-inserting-huff-.patch b/grub/grub-efi/debian/patches/0036-video-readers-png-Avoid-heap-OOB-R-W-inserting-huff-.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..12ca7830e --- /dev/null +++ b/grub/grub-efi/debian/patches/0036-video-readers-png-Avoid-heap-OOB-R-W-inserting-huff-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +From b54f7505732ad5c6237a133c0a1cf00774f13508 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Axtens +Date: Tue, 6 Jul 2021 23:25:07 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH 2/6] video/readers/png: Avoid heap OOB R/W inserting huff + table items + +In fuzzing we observed crashes where a code would attempt to be inserted +into a huffman table before the start, leading to a set of heap OOB reads +and writes as table entries with negative indices were shifted around and +the new code written in. + +Catch the case where we would underflow the array and bail. + +Fixes: CVE-2021-3696 + +Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/video/readers/png.c | 7 +++++++ + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/video/readers/png.c b/grub-core/video/readers/png.c +index 1e35eae..0356f91 100644 +--- a/grub-core/video/readers/png.c ++++ b/grub-core/video/readers/png.c +@@ -420,6 +420,13 @@ grub_png_insert_huff_item (struct huff_table *ht, int code, int len) + for (i = len; i < ht->max_length; i++) + n += ht->maxval[i]; + ++ if (n > ht->num_values) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, ++ "png: out of range inserting huffman table item"); ++ return; ++ } ++ + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) + ht->values[ht->num_values - i] = ht->values[ht->num_values - i - 1]; + +-- +2.17.1 + diff --git a/grub/grub-efi/debian/patches/0037-video-readers-jpeg-Block-int-underflow-wild-pointer-.patch b/grub/grub-efi/debian/patches/0037-video-readers-jpeg-Block-int-underflow-wild-pointer-.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d4471cd35 --- /dev/null +++ b/grub/grub-efi/debian/patches/0037-video-readers-jpeg-Block-int-underflow-wild-pointer-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +From a10c2350a766f9b315735931a49499a7e2c77bf3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Axtens +Date: Mon, 4 Sep 2023 16:32:43 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH 3/6] video/readers/jpeg: Block int underflow -> wild pointer + write + +Certain 1 px wide images caused a wild pointer write in +grub_jpeg_ycrcb_to_rgb(). This was caused because in grub_jpeg_decode_data(), +we have the following loop: + +for (; data->r1 < nr1 && (!data->dri || rst); + data->r1++, data->bitmap_ptr += (vb * data->image_width - hb * nc1) * 3) + +We did not check if vb * width >= hb * nc1. + +On a 64-bit platform, if that turns out to be negative, it will underflow, +be interpreted as unsigned 64-bit, then be added to the 64-bit pointer, so +we see data->bitmap_ptr jump, e.g.: + +0x6180_0000_0480 to +0x6181_0000_0498 + ^ + ~--- carry has occurred and this pointer is now far away from + any object. + +On a 32-bit platform, it will decrement the pointer, creating a pointer +that won't crash but will overwrite random data. + +Catch the underflow and error out. + +Fixes: CVE-2021-3697 + +Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +[lz: Adapt the patch for context changes] +Signed-off-by: Li Zhou +--- + grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c | 10 +++++++++- + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c b/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c +index 0eeea0e..fdaef18 100644 +--- a/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c ++++ b/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c +@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+"); + +@@ -643,6 +644,7 @@ static grub_err_t + grub_jpeg_decode_data (struct grub_jpeg_data *data) + { + unsigned c1, vb, hb, nr1, nc1; ++ unsigned stride_a, stride_b, stride; + int rst = data->dri; + + vb = 8 << data->log_vs; +@@ -654,8 +656,14 @@ grub_jpeg_decode_data (struct grub_jpeg_data *data) + return grub_error(GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, + "jpeg: attempted to decode data before start of stream"); + ++ if (grub_mul(vb, data->image_width, &stride_a) || ++ grub_mul(hb, nc1, &stride_b) || ++ grub_sub(stride_a, stride_b, &stride)) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, ++ "jpeg: cannot decode image with these dimensions"); ++ + for (; data->r1 < nr1 && (!data->dri || rst); +- data->r1++, data->bitmap_ptr += (vb * data->image_width - hb * nc1) * 3) ++ data->r1++, data->bitmap_ptr += stride * 3) + for (c1 = 0; c1 < nc1 && (!data->dri || rst); + c1++, rst--, data->bitmap_ptr += hb * 3) + { +-- +2.17.1 + diff --git a/grub/grub-efi/debian/patches/0038-net-ip-Do-IP-fragment-maths-safely.patch b/grub/grub-efi/debian/patches/0038-net-ip-Do-IP-fragment-maths-safely.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4473c62d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/grub/grub-efi/debian/patches/0038-net-ip-Do-IP-fragment-maths-safely.patch @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +From 5d2f1e350e39677938a70c17a163f1a9cde36a18 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Axtens +Date: Mon, 20 Dec 2021 19:41:21 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH 4/6] net/ip: Do IP fragment maths safely + +This avoids an underflow and subsequent unpleasantness. + +Fixes: CVE-2022-28733 + +Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/net/ip.c | 10 +++++++++- + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/net/ip.c b/grub-core/net/ip.c +index ea5edf8..74e4e8b 100644 +--- a/grub-core/net/ip.c ++++ b/grub-core/net/ip.c +@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + #include + + struct iphdr { +@@ -512,7 +513,14 @@ grub_net_recv_ip4_packets (struct grub_net_buff *nb, + { + rsm->total_len = (8 * (grub_be_to_cpu16 (iph->frags) & OFFSET_MASK) + + (nb->tail - nb->data)); +- rsm->total_len -= ((iph->verhdrlen & 0xf) * sizeof (grub_uint32_t)); ++ ++ if (grub_sub (rsm->total_len, (iph->verhdrlen & 0xf) * sizeof (grub_uint32_t), ++ &rsm->total_len)) ++ { ++ grub_dprintf ("net", "IP reassembly size underflow\n"); ++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE; ++ } ++ + rsm->asm_netbuff = grub_netbuff_alloc (rsm->total_len); + if (!rsm->asm_netbuff) + { +-- +2.17.1 + diff --git a/grub/grub-efi/debian/patches/0039-net-http-Fix-OOB-write-for-split-http-headers.patch b/grub/grub-efi/debian/patches/0039-net-http-Fix-OOB-write-for-split-http-headers.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..67795be6c --- /dev/null +++ b/grub/grub-efi/debian/patches/0039-net-http-Fix-OOB-write-for-split-http-headers.patch @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +From f37943427c5bf16a0003d3049221da698006f6f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Axtens +Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2022 18:17:03 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH 5/6] net/http: Fix OOB write for split http headers + +GRUB has special code for handling an http header that is split +across two packets. + +The code tracks the end of line by looking for a "\n" byte. The +code for split headers has always advanced the pointer just past the +end of the line, whereas the code that handles unsplit headers does +not advance the pointer. This extra advance causes the length to be +one greater, which breaks an assumption in parse_line(), leading to +it writing a NUL byte one byte past the end of the buffer where we +reconstruct the line from the two packets. + +It's conceivable that an attacker controlled set of packets could +cause this to zero out the first byte of the "next" pointer of the +grub_mm_region structure following the current_line buffer. + +Do not advance the pointer in the split header case. + +Fixes: CVE-2022-28734 + +Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/net/http.c | 4 +--- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/net/http.c b/grub-core/net/http.c +index b616cf4..a19b0a2 100644 +--- a/grub-core/net/http.c ++++ b/grub-core/net/http.c +@@ -190,9 +190,7 @@ http_receive (grub_net_tcp_socket_t sock __attribute__ ((unused)), + int have_line = 1; + char *t; + ptr = grub_memchr (nb->data, '\n', nb->tail - nb->data); +- if (ptr) +- ptr++; +- else ++ if (ptr == NULL) + { + have_line = 0; + ptr = (char *) nb->tail; +-- +2.17.1 + diff --git a/grub/grub-efi/debian/patches/0040-net-http-Error-out-on-headers-with-LF-without-CR.patch b/grub/grub-efi/debian/patches/0040-net-http-Error-out-on-headers-with-LF-without-CR.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4b3178c6b --- /dev/null +++ b/grub/grub-efi/debian/patches/0040-net-http-Error-out-on-headers-with-LF-without-CR.patch @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +From c96929e9eea455b07e0c2e06bc401eea6bf2be11 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Axtens +Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2022 19:04:40 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH 6/6] net/http: Error out on headers with LF without CR + +In a similar vein to the previous patch, parse_line() would write +a NUL byte past the end of the buffer if there was an HTTP header +with a LF rather than a CRLF. + +RFC-2616 says: + + Many HTTP/1.1 header field values consist of words separated by LWS + or special characters. These special characters MUST be in a quoted + string to be used within a parameter value (as defined in section 3.6). + +We don't support quoted sections or continuation lines, etc. + +If we see an LF that's not part of a CRLF, bail out. + +Fixes: CVE-2022-28734 + +Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/net/http.c | 8 ++++++++ + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/net/http.c b/grub-core/net/http.c +index a19b0a2..1fa62b5 100644 +--- a/grub-core/net/http.c ++++ b/grub-core/net/http.c +@@ -68,7 +68,15 @@ parse_line (grub_file_t file, http_data_t data, char *ptr, grub_size_t len) + char *end = ptr + len; + while (end > ptr && *(end - 1) == '\r') + end--; ++ ++ /* LF without CR. */ ++ if (end == ptr + len) ++ { ++ data->errmsg = grub_strdup (_("invalid HTTP header - LF without CR")); ++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE; ++ } + *end = 0; ++ + /* Trailing CRLF. */ + if (data->in_chunk_len == 1) + { +-- +2.17.1 + diff --git a/grub/grub-efi/debian/patches/series b/grub/grub-efi/debian/patches/series index 2d1c991fa..9b41090ec 100644 --- a/grub/grub-efi/debian/patches/series +++ b/grub/grub-efi/debian/patches/series @@ -32,3 +32,9 @@ 0032-font-Harden-grub_font_blit_glyph-and-grub_font_blit_.patch 0033-font-Assign-null_font-to-glyphs-in-ascii_font_glyph.patch 0034-normal-charset-Fix-an-integer-overflow-in-grub_unico.patch +0035-video-readers-png-Drop-greyscale-support-to-fix-heap.patch +0036-video-readers-png-Avoid-heap-OOB-R-W-inserting-huff-.patch +0037-video-readers-jpeg-Block-int-underflow-wild-pointer-.patch +0038-net-ip-Do-IP-fragment-maths-safely.patch +0039-net-http-Fix-OOB-write-for-split-http-headers.patch +0040-net-http-Error-out-on-headers-with-LF-without-CR.patch diff --git a/grub/grub2/debian/patches/0018-video-readers-png-Drop-greyscale-support-to-fix-heap.patch b/grub/grub2/debian/patches/0018-video-readers-png-Drop-greyscale-support-to-fix-heap.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..efacbb2c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/grub/grub2/debian/patches/0018-video-readers-png-Drop-greyscale-support-to-fix-heap.patch @@ -0,0 +1,171 @@ +From 157486f818ecbe26b7962f5795a8f48393ba5169 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Axtens +Date: Tue, 6 Jul 2021 18:51:35 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH 1/6] video/readers/png: Drop greyscale support to fix heap + out-of-bounds write + +A 16-bit greyscale PNG without alpha is processed in the following loop: + + for (i = 0; i < (data->image_width * data->image_height); + i++, d1 += 4, d2 += 2) + { + d1[R3] = d2[1]; + d1[G3] = d2[1]; + d1[B3] = d2[1]; + } + +The increment of d1 is wrong. d1 is incremented by 4 bytes per iteration, +but there are only 3 bytes allocated for storage. This means that image +data will overwrite somewhat-attacker-controlled parts of memory - 3 bytes +out of every 4 following the end of the image. + +This has existed since greyscale support was added in 2013 in commit +3ccf16dff98f (grub-core/video/readers/png.c: Support grayscale). + +Saving starfield.png as a 16-bit greyscale image without alpha in the gimp +and attempting to load it causes grub-emu to crash - I don't think this code +has ever worked. + +Delete all PNG greyscale support. + +Fixes: CVE-2021-3695 + +Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/video/readers/png.c | 87 +++-------------------------------- + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 80 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/video/readers/png.c b/grub-core/video/readers/png.c +index 4827b9c..1e35eae 100644 +--- a/grub-core/video/readers/png.c ++++ b/grub-core/video/readers/png.c +@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ struct grub_png_data + + unsigned image_width, image_height; + int bpp, is_16bit; +- int raw_bytes, is_gray, is_alpha, is_palette; ++ int raw_bytes, is_alpha, is_palette; + int row_bytes, color_bits; + grub_uint8_t *image_data; + +@@ -284,13 +284,13 @@ grub_png_decode_image_header (struct grub_png_data *data) + data->bpp = 3; + else + { +- data->is_gray = 1; +- data->bpp = 1; ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, ++ "png: color type not supported"); + } + + if ((color_bits != 8) && (color_bits != 16) + && (color_bits != 4 +- || !(data->is_gray || data->is_palette))) ++ || !data->is_palette)) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, + "png: bit depth must be 8 or 16"); + +@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ grub_png_decode_image_header (struct grub_png_data *data) + } + + #ifndef GRUB_CPU_WORDS_BIGENDIAN +- if (data->is_16bit || data->is_gray || data->is_palette) ++ if (data->is_16bit || data->is_palette) + #endif + { + data->image_data = grub_calloc (data->image_height, data->row_bytes); +@@ -863,27 +863,8 @@ grub_png_convert_image (struct grub_png_data *data) + int shift; + int mask = (1 << data->color_bits) - 1; + unsigned j; +- if (data->is_gray) +- { +- /* Generic formula is +- (0xff * i) / ((1U << data->color_bits) - 1) +- but for allowed bit depth of 1, 2 and for it's +- equivalent to +- (0xff / ((1U << data->color_bits) - 1)) * i +- Precompute the multipliers to avoid division. +- */ +- +- const grub_uint8_t multipliers[5] = { 0xff, 0xff, 0x55, 0x24, 0x11 }; +- for (i = 0; i < (1U << data->color_bits); i++) +- { +- grub_uint8_t col = multipliers[data->color_bits] * i; +- palette[i][0] = col; +- palette[i][1] = col; +- palette[i][2] = col; +- } +- } +- else +- grub_memcpy (palette, data->palette, 3 << data->color_bits); ++ ++ grub_memcpy (palette, data->palette, 3 << data->color_bits); + d1c = d1; + d2c = d2; + for (j = 0; j < data->image_height; j++, d1c += data->image_width * 3, +@@ -920,60 +901,6 @@ grub_png_convert_image (struct grub_png_data *data) + } + return; + } +- +- if (data->is_gray) +- { +- switch (data->bpp) +- { +- case 4: +- /* 16-bit gray with alpha. */ +- for (i = 0; i < (data->image_width * data->image_height); +- i++, d1 += 4, d2 += 4) +- { +- d1[R4] = d2[3]; +- d1[G4] = d2[3]; +- d1[B4] = d2[3]; +- d1[A4] = d2[1]; +- } +- break; +- case 2: +- if (data->is_16bit) +- /* 16-bit gray without alpha. */ +- { +- for (i = 0; i < (data->image_width * data->image_height); +- i++, d1 += 4, d2 += 2) +- { +- d1[R3] = d2[1]; +- d1[G3] = d2[1]; +- d1[B3] = d2[1]; +- } +- } +- else +- /* 8-bit gray with alpha. */ +- { +- for (i = 0; i < (data->image_width * data->image_height); +- i++, d1 += 4, d2 += 2) +- { +- d1[R4] = d2[1]; +- d1[G4] = d2[1]; +- d1[B4] = d2[1]; +- d1[A4] = d2[0]; +- } +- } +- break; +- /* 8-bit gray without alpha. */ +- case 1: +- for (i = 0; i < (data->image_width * data->image_height); +- i++, d1 += 3, d2++) +- { +- d1[R3] = d2[0]; +- d1[G3] = d2[0]; +- d1[B3] = d2[0]; +- } +- break; +- } +- return; +- } + + { + /* Only copy the upper 8 bit. */ +-- +2.17.1 + diff --git a/grub/grub2/debian/patches/0019-video-readers-png-Avoid-heap-OOB-R-W-inserting-huff-.patch b/grub/grub2/debian/patches/0019-video-readers-png-Avoid-heap-OOB-R-W-inserting-huff-.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..12ca7830e --- /dev/null +++ b/grub/grub2/debian/patches/0019-video-readers-png-Avoid-heap-OOB-R-W-inserting-huff-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +From b54f7505732ad5c6237a133c0a1cf00774f13508 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Axtens +Date: Tue, 6 Jul 2021 23:25:07 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH 2/6] video/readers/png: Avoid heap OOB R/W inserting huff + table items + +In fuzzing we observed crashes where a code would attempt to be inserted +into a huffman table before the start, leading to a set of heap OOB reads +and writes as table entries with negative indices were shifted around and +the new code written in. + +Catch the case where we would underflow the array and bail. + +Fixes: CVE-2021-3696 + +Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/video/readers/png.c | 7 +++++++ + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/video/readers/png.c b/grub-core/video/readers/png.c +index 1e35eae..0356f91 100644 +--- a/grub-core/video/readers/png.c ++++ b/grub-core/video/readers/png.c +@@ -420,6 +420,13 @@ grub_png_insert_huff_item (struct huff_table *ht, int code, int len) + for (i = len; i < ht->max_length; i++) + n += ht->maxval[i]; + ++ if (n > ht->num_values) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, ++ "png: out of range inserting huffman table item"); ++ return; ++ } ++ + for (i = 0; i < n; i++) + ht->values[ht->num_values - i] = ht->values[ht->num_values - i - 1]; + +-- +2.17.1 + diff --git a/grub/grub2/debian/patches/0020-video-readers-jpeg-Block-int-underflow-wild-pointer-.patch b/grub/grub2/debian/patches/0020-video-readers-jpeg-Block-int-underflow-wild-pointer-.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d4471cd35 --- /dev/null +++ b/grub/grub2/debian/patches/0020-video-readers-jpeg-Block-int-underflow-wild-pointer-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +From a10c2350a766f9b315735931a49499a7e2c77bf3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Axtens +Date: Mon, 4 Sep 2023 16:32:43 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH 3/6] video/readers/jpeg: Block int underflow -> wild pointer + write + +Certain 1 px wide images caused a wild pointer write in +grub_jpeg_ycrcb_to_rgb(). This was caused because in grub_jpeg_decode_data(), +we have the following loop: + +for (; data->r1 < nr1 && (!data->dri || rst); + data->r1++, data->bitmap_ptr += (vb * data->image_width - hb * nc1) * 3) + +We did not check if vb * width >= hb * nc1. + +On a 64-bit platform, if that turns out to be negative, it will underflow, +be interpreted as unsigned 64-bit, then be added to the 64-bit pointer, so +we see data->bitmap_ptr jump, e.g.: + +0x6180_0000_0480 to +0x6181_0000_0498 + ^ + ~--- carry has occurred and this pointer is now far away from + any object. + +On a 32-bit platform, it will decrement the pointer, creating a pointer +that won't crash but will overwrite random data. + +Catch the underflow and error out. + +Fixes: CVE-2021-3697 + +Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +[lz: Adapt the patch for context changes] +Signed-off-by: Li Zhou +--- + grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c | 10 +++++++++- + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c b/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c +index 0eeea0e..fdaef18 100644 +--- a/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c ++++ b/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c +@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+"); + +@@ -643,6 +644,7 @@ static grub_err_t + grub_jpeg_decode_data (struct grub_jpeg_data *data) + { + unsigned c1, vb, hb, nr1, nc1; ++ unsigned stride_a, stride_b, stride; + int rst = data->dri; + + vb = 8 << data->log_vs; +@@ -654,8 +656,14 @@ grub_jpeg_decode_data (struct grub_jpeg_data *data) + return grub_error(GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, + "jpeg: attempted to decode data before start of stream"); + ++ if (grub_mul(vb, data->image_width, &stride_a) || ++ grub_mul(hb, nc1, &stride_b) || ++ grub_sub(stride_a, stride_b, &stride)) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, ++ "jpeg: cannot decode image with these dimensions"); ++ + for (; data->r1 < nr1 && (!data->dri || rst); +- data->r1++, data->bitmap_ptr += (vb * data->image_width - hb * nc1) * 3) ++ data->r1++, data->bitmap_ptr += stride * 3) + for (c1 = 0; c1 < nc1 && (!data->dri || rst); + c1++, rst--, data->bitmap_ptr += hb * 3) + { +-- +2.17.1 + diff --git a/grub/grub2/debian/patches/0021-net-ip-Do-IP-fragment-maths-safely.patch b/grub/grub2/debian/patches/0021-net-ip-Do-IP-fragment-maths-safely.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4473c62d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/grub/grub2/debian/patches/0021-net-ip-Do-IP-fragment-maths-safely.patch @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +From 5d2f1e350e39677938a70c17a163f1a9cde36a18 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Axtens +Date: Mon, 20 Dec 2021 19:41:21 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH 4/6] net/ip: Do IP fragment maths safely + +This avoids an underflow and subsequent unpleasantness. + +Fixes: CVE-2022-28733 + +Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/net/ip.c | 10 +++++++++- + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/net/ip.c b/grub-core/net/ip.c +index ea5edf8..74e4e8b 100644 +--- a/grub-core/net/ip.c ++++ b/grub-core/net/ip.c +@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + #include + + struct iphdr { +@@ -512,7 +513,14 @@ grub_net_recv_ip4_packets (struct grub_net_buff *nb, + { + rsm->total_len = (8 * (grub_be_to_cpu16 (iph->frags) & OFFSET_MASK) + + (nb->tail - nb->data)); +- rsm->total_len -= ((iph->verhdrlen & 0xf) * sizeof (grub_uint32_t)); ++ ++ if (grub_sub (rsm->total_len, (iph->verhdrlen & 0xf) * sizeof (grub_uint32_t), ++ &rsm->total_len)) ++ { ++ grub_dprintf ("net", "IP reassembly size underflow\n"); ++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE; ++ } ++ + rsm->asm_netbuff = grub_netbuff_alloc (rsm->total_len); + if (!rsm->asm_netbuff) + { +-- +2.17.1 + diff --git a/grub/grub2/debian/patches/0022-net-http-Fix-OOB-write-for-split-http-headers.patch b/grub/grub2/debian/patches/0022-net-http-Fix-OOB-write-for-split-http-headers.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..67795be6c --- /dev/null +++ b/grub/grub2/debian/patches/0022-net-http-Fix-OOB-write-for-split-http-headers.patch @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +From f37943427c5bf16a0003d3049221da698006f6f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Axtens +Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2022 18:17:03 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH 5/6] net/http: Fix OOB write for split http headers + +GRUB has special code for handling an http header that is split +across two packets. + +The code tracks the end of line by looking for a "\n" byte. The +code for split headers has always advanced the pointer just past the +end of the line, whereas the code that handles unsplit headers does +not advance the pointer. This extra advance causes the length to be +one greater, which breaks an assumption in parse_line(), leading to +it writing a NUL byte one byte past the end of the buffer where we +reconstruct the line from the two packets. + +It's conceivable that an attacker controlled set of packets could +cause this to zero out the first byte of the "next" pointer of the +grub_mm_region structure following the current_line buffer. + +Do not advance the pointer in the split header case. + +Fixes: CVE-2022-28734 + +Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/net/http.c | 4 +--- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/net/http.c b/grub-core/net/http.c +index b616cf4..a19b0a2 100644 +--- a/grub-core/net/http.c ++++ b/grub-core/net/http.c +@@ -190,9 +190,7 @@ http_receive (grub_net_tcp_socket_t sock __attribute__ ((unused)), + int have_line = 1; + char *t; + ptr = grub_memchr (nb->data, '\n', nb->tail - nb->data); +- if (ptr) +- ptr++; +- else ++ if (ptr == NULL) + { + have_line = 0; + ptr = (char *) nb->tail; +-- +2.17.1 + diff --git a/grub/grub2/debian/patches/0023-net-http-Error-out-on-headers-with-LF-without-CR.patch b/grub/grub2/debian/patches/0023-net-http-Error-out-on-headers-with-LF-without-CR.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4b3178c6b --- /dev/null +++ b/grub/grub2/debian/patches/0023-net-http-Error-out-on-headers-with-LF-without-CR.patch @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +From c96929e9eea455b07e0c2e06bc401eea6bf2be11 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Axtens +Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2022 19:04:40 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH 6/6] net/http: Error out on headers with LF without CR + +In a similar vein to the previous patch, parse_line() would write +a NUL byte past the end of the buffer if there was an HTTP header +with a LF rather than a CRLF. + +RFC-2616 says: + + Many HTTP/1.1 header field values consist of words separated by LWS + or special characters. These special characters MUST be in a quoted + string to be used within a parameter value (as defined in section 3.6). + +We don't support quoted sections or continuation lines, etc. + +If we see an LF that's not part of a CRLF, bail out. + +Fixes: CVE-2022-28734 + +Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/net/http.c | 8 ++++++++ + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/net/http.c b/grub-core/net/http.c +index a19b0a2..1fa62b5 100644 +--- a/grub-core/net/http.c ++++ b/grub-core/net/http.c +@@ -68,7 +68,15 @@ parse_line (grub_file_t file, http_data_t data, char *ptr, grub_size_t len) + char *end = ptr + len; + while (end > ptr && *(end - 1) == '\r') + end--; ++ ++ /* LF without CR. */ ++ if (end == ptr + len) ++ { ++ data->errmsg = grub_strdup (_("invalid HTTP header - LF without CR")); ++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE; ++ } + *end = 0; ++ + /* Trailing CRLF. */ + if (data->in_chunk_len == 1) + { +-- +2.17.1 + diff --git a/grub/grub2/debian/patches/series b/grub/grub2/debian/patches/series index 465b0f008..3c311b847 100644 --- a/grub/grub2/debian/patches/series +++ b/grub/grub2/debian/patches/series @@ -15,3 +15,9 @@ 0015-font-Harden-grub_font_blit_glyph-and-grub_font_blit_.patch 0016-font-Assign-null_font-to-glyphs-in-ascii_font_glyph.patch 0017-normal-charset-Fix-an-integer-overflow-in-grub_unico.patch +0018-video-readers-png-Drop-greyscale-support-to-fix-heap.patch +0019-video-readers-png-Avoid-heap-OOB-R-W-inserting-huff-.patch +0020-video-readers-jpeg-Block-int-underflow-wild-pointer-.patch +0021-net-ip-Do-IP-fragment-maths-safely.patch +0022-net-http-Fix-OOB-write-for-split-http-headers.patch +0023-net-http-Error-out-on-headers-with-LF-without-CR.patch